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Et vous, cruels Européens, ne vous irritez pas de ma harangue. Ni le
Hottentot, ni l’habitant des contrées qui vous restent à devaster ne
l’entendront. Si mon discours vous offense, c’est que vous n’êtes pas plus
humains que vos prédécesseurs; c’est que vous voyez dans la haine que je
leur ai vouée celle que j’ai pour vous.
Denis Diderot, Histoire des Deux Indes, Tome Premier, p. 259
At the time of its 2005 publication, Jennifer Pitts’ A Turn to Empire was among
a handful of works in political theory probing imperialism’s constitutive influence
over modern political thought. Following Uday Singh Mehta’s path-breaking
Liberalism and Empire (1999), theorists such as Pitts, James Tully, Sankar Muthu
and Karuna Mantena developed far-reaching expositions of seminal thinkers’
historical, biographical and conceptual entanglements in projects of empire, pulling
imperialism and colonialism from the discipline’s margins to its center and setting
into motion a broader confrontation with its Eurocentric past. In the 1990s and
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earlier, historians of political thought such as Tully, Barbara Arneil, David
Armitage and Bhikhu Parekh had excavated early modern theorists’ relations to
imperialism (Locke in particular), alongside efforts by Anthony Pagden, Richard
Tuck and J.G.A. Pocock to draw empire more prominently into the study of the
history of political thought. But broadly speaking, as Pitts (2010) observes, political
theory was astonishingly late in registering empire’s imprint over its methods and
field of vision when a great many related disciplines – anthropology, literary
studies, history, postcolonial theory – got there decades earlier.
With the 2018 publication of Boundaries of the International, Pitts returns to a
now thriving, wide-ranging and cross-pollinated field of study. The intervening
years have, gladly, witnessed the scholarship’s development in several respects.
First, it now canvasses a broader geographical and temporal scope, expanding
beyond decolonial (Mignolo, 2011; Lugones, 2008; Quijano, 2007) and postcolo-
nial (Said, 1978; Bhabha, 1994; Chakrabarty, 2000; Spivak, 1999) literatures cen-
tered, respectively, on Latin America and India, to capture empire’s political
impacts in the Caribbean, Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa, and on
Indigenous peoples in North America and Australasia. It has also traveled to the
other side of the colonial divide, as political theorists have engaged the capacious
projections of political independence and global interdependence advanced by
colonial subjects, from Indian nationalists’ advocacy of a Pan-Asian ‘alliance of
England’s oppressed’ (Krishnavarma, 1907) to the ‘world-making’ globalisms
championed by mid-century Black Atlantic thinkers (Getachew, 2019), and from
transnational cosmopolitanisms from below (Valdez, 2019) to the variegated social
forms that, Timothy Vasko argues below, have always lurked beneath the banner of
the international. Such interventions have, still further, yielded methodological
innovations, from Juliet Hooker’s juxtaposition of figures bound by hemispheric
proximity (2017) to Jane Gordon’s ‘creolizing’ political thought (2014). The turn to
empire has thus stretched the discipline’s boundaries to encompass neighboring
fields’ critical efforts and to expand its own, drawing on – and drawing in –
decolonial, anti-colonial and postcolonial scholarship, global intellectual history,
comparative political thought, critical race theory, Indigenous political thought and
much more. It has also sparked self-examinations concerning conceptual inheri-
tance – how contemporary interlocutors might position themselves in relation to
corpuses mired in historical injustice. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it has
forced a disciplinary reckoning, rendering it impossible to ignore the outward-
looking face of modern political thought. Against a discipline that long indulged
the obscurantist fantasy of emanating from Europeans talking among and about
themselves, the turn to empire shows that the modern political imaginary was
global from the outset, forged in relation to the necessities of empire.
It’s a measure of the distance traveled that theorists of empire have, also,
become self-reflexive of – and self-critical toward – their own endeavor. Taking the
publication of Boundaries of the International as a point of departure, this critical
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exchange considers the afterlives of empire and colonialism in political theory. It
asks how we might today take up the challenge of thinking politically in a world
marked by colonial and imperialist depredations, past and present. The idea is to
venture a few responses to the question of what political theorists attentive to the
impacts of empire might think about in moving the discipline forward – to take
stock of where the scholarship is and where it might go.
And it has come some way, in a few ways. To begin with, as it has evolved, its
categories and concerns have become more finely parsed, particularly as regards
the separation of empire and settler colonialism. Where Mehta reflected two
decades ago that in the empire, liberalism had found the ‘concrete place of its
dreams’ (1999, p. 37), Duncan Bell has suggested that this incarnation may, in fact,
have been in the settler colonies (2016). Their clearer demarcation has had the
felicitous consequence of raising questions and uncovering injustices surrounding
settler colonialism that don’t appear on empire’s analytical register. The concept of
dispossession, for instance, whose centrality to the expansion of the American
republic is illuminated by Aziz Rana (2010) and Adam Dahl (2018), has been
subjected to a nuanced and far-reaching theoretical critique by Robert Nichols
(2020). Indeed, the recent efflorescence of Indigenous political thought (Coulthard,
2014; Simpson, 2017; Estes, 2019), and of political thought on Indigeneity and
settler colonialism (Bhandar, 2018; Dhillon, 2017; Temin, 2018), centers a
conceptual nomenclature – on land, space, dispossession, and occupation –
reflecting the specificities of historical and ongoing colonial domination in North
America and Oceania. It also bridges often disparate modes of political-theoretical
inquiry: Glen Coulthard’s Red Skin, White Masks (2014) weds a careful historical
survey of the Canadian state’s ever-mutating genocidal policies toward Indigenous
populations with Marx’s and Fanon’s critical insights, just as Burke Hendrix (2019)
draws persistent injustice toward Indigenous peoples to bear on normative theory,
whose appeals to ideal-type principles – as Charles Mills has long argued (2005) –
mask the systemic asymmetries of power shaping contemporary societies.
The turn to empire also entails certain methodological transformations, notably,
as is limned above, a rapprochement between political theory and cognate
disciplines (Byrd, 2011; Simpson, 2014; Morefield, forthcoming 2021) and the
development of a much more catholic scholarship bristling against the disciplinary
boundaries jealously guarded by their predecessors. Where once territorial debates
raged around the demarcations of political theory and political philosophy,
normative and historical scholarship, or how we ought to read and interpret
canonical texts, political theorists of empire have had little truck with orthodoxies
ill-fitted to the complexities. They have exercised a willful and principled disregard
for the gatekeeping tendencies delimiting the field’s borders, taking the concepts,
methods and concerns of surrounding disciplines as useful – necessary, even – tools
for theorizing a constitutionally imperial world. This should come as little surprise
to those attuned to its insights. As Pitts here and in Boundaries persuasively argues,
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and as Vasko elaborates, the discipline’s ‘traditional’ conceits and divisions –
between theory and IR, domestic and international, and surrounding what Ulas Ince
characterizes below as theory’s methodological nationalism – have masked
political science’s imperialist scaffolding. They’ve subtended the fiction of a
pacific global order depicting inequality, marginalization and violence as exter-
nalities, rather than, as Nichols observes, constitutive features of the lived
experience of subjects of Euro-American empire.
To be sure, political theory – at least since the 1960s – has enjoyed a close
relationship to history, more willing to cede ground to a sister discipline similarly
concerned with the ideas and contexts of seminal political thinkers. This is
particularly true of the scholarship on empire that, as all of the contributors here
recognize, traces its roots back to Cambridge School intellectual historians’
expositions of the imperialist embroilments of ‘great thinkers’. For all of the work
it’s done to transform how we read those thinkers, however, intellectual history –
like all fields – carries certain limitations that critical social theory and social
history, Nichols and Ince argue, draw to light. Intellectual history exhumes what
Nichols describes as the first-person standpoint of Euro-American elites (focusing
on colonial intent); social theory, by contrast, turns our attention to the material and
economic conditions rendering their claims tractable and, perhaps more pro-
foundly, enables a perspectival pivot to the standpoint of the colonized (focusing on
colonial effect). Social history thus alters the lens through which we conceptualize
imperialism and colonialism, answering questions to which intellectual history
provides no satisfactory response and shifting the measures by which we evaluate
empire – and history – altogether.
Such disciplinary renovations have cut across the ideological spectrum, pushing
political theorists of various stripes to confront the traces of empire lingering in its
dominant traditions. Departing from postcolonial critiques of developmentalism
and historicism (Chakrabarty, 2000; Nandy, 1994), the turn to empire has
occasioned retrospection on the reverberations of empire in liberalism (Ivison,
2002; Mantena, 2010; Muthu, 2003; Marwah, 2019), Marxism (Anderson, 2010;
Harootunian, 2017; Paquette, 2012), and critical theory (McCarthy, 2009; Allen,
2016; Ingram, 2018), as scholars have sought not only to disinter the colonial
foundations of their architectonics, but also to chart a way forward from them.
Against the procrustean tendencies toward which doctrines naturally tilt, theorists
of empire have drawn out their interruptions, i.e. those points of friction between
the universalisms rationalizing imperialist domination and the stubborn recalci-
trance of those subject to it. These critical efforts are far from limited to history, as
universalist and developmentalist pretensions remain alive and well in the
neocolonial institutions and global order that, James Tully (2008) and Jeanne
Morefield (2014) note – along with Pitts below – continue to populate the liberal
internationalist imagination.
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Finally, the turn to empire invites reflection on what counts as political theory at
all, as regards the objects and substance of our study – what we read and what we
do. The Archimedean perch from which much theory, normative and historical,
issues is neither neutral nor encompassing: it’s the viewpoint of one mode of theory
among what we ought to recognize as a great many others. Theory need not involve
grappling with great thinkers, great texts or great ideas – finding the parts of a
Locke, Marx, or Paine that we might like, or not like, or want to recover for
whatever purposes. It might also involve reconstructing notions of autonomy,
resistance and self-determination advanced in what Ince captures as the ‘middle’
political thought of legislators, administrators and agitators. It can be, as
comparative political theorists have shown, entering the theoretical worlds of
non-western thinkers eclipsed by narrowly construed academic canon-building. It
can be what Alex Livingston (2020) has coined in the pages of this journal as
‘thinking with the streets’, where theorists engage ‘vernacular theories articulated
by movement actors themselves’ to ‘recover lost concepts and languages, expand
our political imaginaries in novel ways… [and] leverag[e] the estranging effects of
movement discourses and archives to reconsider from the outside, so to speak, our
own disciplinary concepts’ (2020). It can be reading ‘ephemera’ (Bayly, 2007,
p. 167), the pamphlets, broadsheets and polemics that were the lifeblood of colonial
India’s nationalist movements, tracing out bodies of political thought marked by
what Ranajit Guha evocatively describes as the ‘impact of living contradictions’
(1988, p. 41). It can be working with anti-colonial radicals’ and provocateurs’
political theory, falling well short of the analytical rigor and systematicity to which
our Kants and Hegels aspired, precisely because it’s driven by the imperatives of
non-domination rather than philosophical neatness: because, in a word, it is
political.
To conclude, one thing emerges clearly from the contributions to this exchange:
taking empire seriously doesn’t just add a subject to the roster of political theory’s
concerns, but rather transforms it altogether. Taking empire seriously is to question
the structures of our discipline, uproot the conditions configuring its theoretical
presumptions, widen our methodological lenses, and scrutinize what, whom and
how we read – and why. It’s to shift our vantage point so as to expose the
historically false and normatively pernicious visions of domestic and global order
underpinning it. It’s to recognize that that global order is not the imperfectly
realized cosmopolitan federation that Kant dreamed up some 250 years ago, and
that still haunts contemporary citizenship regimes (Tully, 2014). It remains, rather,
what it always was, which Diderot, writing contemporaneously with Kant, perhaps
better captured. Against Kant’s eupeptic gloss, Diderot acidly observed of
Europeans in the Cape of Good Hope that they ‘descended upon this country to
despoil it’, admonishing colonists for coming to the Hottentot’s ‘hut only to chase
him from it, to substitute him, if you could, for the animals laboring under the
cultivator’s whip, to brutalize him, for no reason other than to satisfy your cupidity’
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(1782, vol. 1, p. 258). Europe’s world-spanning dominance was secured ‘by rivers
of blood that stave off tyranny for a few instants, only to let it fall back with still
greater furor and ferocity upon a nation sooner or later oppressed’ (1782, vol. 8,
pp. 215-216), the endpoint of empires shaped by the simple propulsions of
wealthier states to exploit those weaker than themselves. Nearly two centuries later,
Fanon came to much the same conclusion. ‘European opulence’, he famously
wrote, ‘is literally a scandal for it was built on the backs of slaves, it fed on the
blood of slaves, and owes its very existence to the soil and subsoil of the
underdeveloped world. Europe’s well-being and progress were built with the sweat
and corpses of blacks, Arabs, Indians and Asians. This we are determined never to
forget’ (2005, p. 53). This is the world as it’s come to be, shaped by a half-
millennium of empire. It’s the world that we inhabit and that theory must, today,
take as its point of departure.
Inder S. Marwah
Liberal Democracy and the Tenacity of Empire
The most important feature of the modern world order, arguably, has been its
imperial structure of racialized, capitalist hierarchy. The contours of this hierarchy
of wealth, political power and legal standing have changed significantly since its
inauguration in the fifteenth century, but its continuity as a basic fact and its
implications for the world since so-called decolonization should remain at the
center of our description and analysis. The pervasive nature of these imperial
dynamics means that the tasks for postcolonial political theory are vast. The very
categories that have structured the discipline of political science since the end of
the Second World War contribute to the challenge. Political theory was conceived
in the postwar period largely as the study of the state and of politics within states,
alongside a discipline of International Relations that took itself to be the study of
the relations among states, with an implicit understanding that the states in question
were post-imperial and disavowing its own prewar past as a discipline preoccupied
with the management of colonial and racial hierarchy. Postcolonial theory, in
contrast, refers not to a time after the end of empire, a condition that we are
nowhere near achieving, but rather after the inauguration of the modern imperial
world order (Seth, 2013, p. 1). Twentieth-century anticolonial thought offered
precisely such an ‘expansive account of empire that situated alien rule within
international structures of unequal integration and racial hierarchy’ (Getachew,
2019, p. 2). as well as resourceful political responses to that condition, now just
beginning to be tapped by disciplinary political theory. As I’ll suggest below,
W.E.B. Du Bois’s writings on the global order, beginning during the First World
War, remain one potent source of empirical analysis of and theoretical insight into
this phenomenon. Indeed, the continuing resonance of his account of the imperial
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global order underscores how much persists, despite changes as seemingly
significant as formal decolonization and the onset and then the end of the Cold War.
The tenacity of this imperial formation is due in part to the flexibility, and the
attractions, of some of its key legitimating discourses, including liberalism and
international law. In Boundaries of the International, I studied the relation between
imperial structure and discursive scaffolding by exploring the mutual constitution
of international law and the imperial global order. I stressed the politics of
international law’s conceptual frames: the ways in which an image of the world as
an international community of free and independent states was used to justify
European imperial domination, and sometimes to criticize it, but especially to
occlude it. The state system itself, that is, as an ideology and as a set of legal
institutions and political practices, entrenched imperial hierarchies while simulta-
neously obscuring them with the appearance of formal equality, as it continues to
do. As a conceptual frame, or ‘language of disclosure’, the notion of an
international community of states has thus obscured or distorted much of global
politics since it was invented, and as it was entrenched over the course of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Tully, 2008, vol. 2, p. 127). It follows that any
discussion of the politics of territorial states, or of the world as a system of such
states, must take place alongside a recognition of more fundamental imperial
structures.
Given the extent of the task of taking stock of the persistence of global hierarchy,
I hesitate to write prescriptively about what political theorists concerned with
empire should be considering. Since we were invited to take Boundaries as a point
of departure, though, I can begin by noting some of the ways I had hoped it would
be engaged and taken up, as well as some of the questions and dynamics that the
book does not address and lines of approach that I hope to follow in future work. I
am only too aware of the limitations of the approach I took in Boundaries,
particularly that it privileges discursive contexts over material dynamics and that its
objects are mainly European thinkers, as Vasko, Ince and Nichols observe below.
Among the book’s key preoccupations are the epistemic pitfalls and political
limitations of the dominant conceptual framework that we have for talking about
global politics, as a community of independent territorial states. Boundaries
addresses the historical development of this framework and its occlusions but says
less about their implications for contemporary normative theory. To place imperial
structures at the heart of our critical descriptions of the global order may be to
challenge quite fundamentally both the ideal of an international community of free
and equal nations and the cosmopolitan ideal that has constituted its main rival
within normative international theory. The notion of such a community of states
that respect one another’s autonomy, while offering assistance when needed, is in
many ways a compelling normative vision. But it has always also been, as is
commonly the case in international law, an aspiration couched as a description, a
conflation that has generated two different but related problems. First, to the extent
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that the aspiration has been used as a working description, it has masked the
imperial nature of European states (as in Rawls, 1999). Second, to the extent that
the aspiration has been shaped by empirical assumptions – for instance, as to what
forms of prosperity or solidarity are possible in the modern nation-state – it has
presupposed conditions that came about through imperialism and in many instances
remain dependent on global hierarchies. This is one reason among many to
relinquish ‘liberal-democratic’ states of the global north as normative models.
Du Bois’s critique of what he called ‘democratic despotism’ illuminates these
two intertwined but distinct problems. As I only began to suggest in Boundaries,
Du Bois’s First World War essays offer a profound contrast with the views of the
European international lawyers and political theorists of whom my study is a
critique. Du Bois saw the modern world order not as an expanding community of
states but as a global economic and political system shaped above all by the
dynamics of imperial domination. His early efforts to make sense of the industrial
imperialism of his present involved a longue durée global history linking conquest,
commerce, and race, and showing that the key political developments on which
modern Europeans prided themselves – advancing freedom and equality under
democracy, the increasing prosperity of their populations – were parasitic on
imperial exploitation.
His critique bore on the interaction of ideas and material forces: white supremacy
and European ideas of civilization together with the operations of global capital.
The ideology and the legal and institutional structure of the international system
facilitated the exploitation inevitable under capitalism by placing it in imperial and
racialized spaces outside the bounds of ‘international’ concern. And because
European democratization itself relied on imperial exploitation, empire had
morphed into a distinct and novel phenomenon: ‘democratic despotism’. The
sharing of imperial spoils eased social conflict within Europe, simultaneously
reconciling the ruling ‘captains of industry’ to increased power-sharing at home as
long as they had continued impunity in the colonies, and mitigating the poverty and
political agitation of the European masses through colonial profits and consumer
goods (Du Bois, 1915, p. 709). Despite the fact that the white working classes
themselves suffered under imperial capitalism, white socialists and their labor
supporters failed to acknowledge or to combat the dynamics of global domination
because they were also its beneficiaries: ‘in this crime white labor is particeps
criminis with white capital’ (Du Bois, 1921, p. 7). They had been seduced into
demanding a greater share of imperial profits, rather than recognizing that
ultimately their own liberation depended on their working to end the even more
extreme exploitation of non-whites around the world. On Du Bois’s account, the
modern nation – and therefore the international system – was not, as other critics
such as J.A. Hobson were arguing, perverted by imperialism, but in fact created by
it. The Euro-American nation-state system emerged as an idealization perched atop
structures of global empire.
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A wealth of recent scholarship on empire, settler colonialism, and their
contemporary instantiations, develops these Du Boisian insights, drawing the
connections between racial and imperial domination ‘within’ societies and between
them, tracing the connections between democracy or popular sovereignty and
imperial subjugation, elucidating the dynamics of racial capitalism, and attending
to the resources in anticolonial thought and action, especially in political
solidarities across the global south. As Aziz Rana argued in Two Faces of
American Freedom, freedom and equality among whites in the North American
colonies, and then the United States, depended materially and symbolically on the
exploitation and expropriation of subject communities: ‘settler empire was the
servant of a unique and robust view of self-rule, seen by many as crucial to the
fulfillment of emancipatory ambitions’ (2010, p. 3). Settlers’ ongoing insistence on
interpreting Indigenous claims for land and political autonomy in their own terms,
moreover – as claims for property rights and cultural freedoms – renders them
impervious to the radical challenge such claims pose to the settler-colonial model
of development, capital accumulation by means of dispossession, and the political
practices that depend on them (Coulthard, 2014). These pathologies are closely
bound to the broader dynamics of democratic despotism identified by Du Bois – to
democratization in non-settler imperial states – in ways that bear on both
democratic theory and the study of settler-colonial societies. The economic and
political life of European metropolitan citizens was similarly premised on imperial
domination and expropriation: the industrial productivity enabled by the opening of
agricultural land in the western hemisphere to European economies; the fueling of
the European working class by sugar calories made cheap by the use of slave labor;
the sense of political inclusion of the working class generated by a shared colonial
project. Class conflict in Europe was mitigated, democratic communities forged,
and welfare states inaugurated on the back of imperial expropriation, white
supremacy, and, as Inés Valdez has shown, racialized imperial labor control.
Valdez’s account of the immigration policies of contemporary nation-states as
‘imperial remnants rather than legitimate attributes of sovereignty’ (2019, p. 22)
sheds light on contemporary right-wing populism and exposes the limits of left
positions on migration that seek to protect only domestic labor while leaving
capital’s global exploitation of labor unchallenged. Thanks to the global hegemony
of the United States, the constellation of distinct but connected forms of imperial
domination that has characterized American history – slavery, settler colonialism,
and conquest of both adjacent and more distant territory – has ramified around the
world. As the sociologist Matthew Desmond (2019) has argued, America’s ‘low-
road capitalism’ – characterized by depressed wages, extreme inequality, racism,
union-busting, the punitive disciplining of workers, lax regulation of labor
standards, and ‘normalized insecurity’ – can be traced to slavery. If that low-road
capitalism is not typical of wealthy countries, on Desmond’s account, its centrality
to the world’s largest economy intensifies the imprint of empire on the
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contemporary world economy, while the exploitation by global capital of labor in
more vulnerable states amounts to the exportation of low-road practices outside the
political boundaries, but not the economies, of other wealthy states.
Just as Du Bois had demonstrated the continuities between empires and
European nation-states as their chief modern agents, he also showed that
postcolonial states suffered new iterations of imperial domination obscured by
international law. Anticipating the idea of neo-colonialism developed by Kwame
Nkrumah and others in the 1950s, Du Bois argued in 1925 that Liberia, one of the
few formally independent African states at the time, was wrongly ‘looked upon as a
self-steered craft, master of her own fate instead of being, as she has always been, a
canoe tossed on raging economic currents which eddied out of the slave trade of the
eighteenth-century into the swirl of the World War in the twentieth century’ (Du
Bois, 1925, p. 327). As it was for Liberia in Du Bois’s time, debt remains a major
mechanism of neo-colonial control, now enforced by a rigid ‘statist’ norm of
repayment that states in the global north did not abide by before the 1930s, when
they were the major borrowers and defaults were common. This norm, widely
considered to be both apolitical and indispensable to the functioning of
international finance, is neither. It imposes extraordinary costs on the populations
of postcolonial states, while encouraging speculators and investors to make
indiscriminate loans, confident that, however illegitimate, predatory or transitory a
given regime or loan package, the population is on the hook for repayment (Lienau,
2014; Roos, 2019). In this way, international law and norms, and a flawed,
tendentious understanding of their history, discipline postcolonial states to adhere
to unprecedentedly onerous repayment terms and further entrench their subjugated
international standing.
In Boundaries I followed Martti Koskenniemi in treating law as a set of
discursive and institutional resources mobilized by ‘people with projects’, asking
what sort of political work these resources did for those who deployed them
(Kennedy, 2000; Koskenniemi, 2002; Marks and Lang, 2013). The focus of the
book’s analysis and critique is liberal ideology as it appeared in the discourses of
the law of nations and international law. I recognized the importance of profit
motives and commercial agents to this history, but capitalism was not a central
category of analysis. Still, given that modern empires and capitalism developed
jointly, and must be understood in relation to one other, it would have been useful
to address more explicitly the relationship between liberalism and capitalism, as
does recent Marxian work in the history of international law that has sought to
capture the ‘systemic logics at work’ in international legal hierarchies (Marks,
2008, p. 302) and the literatures on racial capitalism and colonialism that Ince flags
below. Where my emphasis in Boundaries tended to be on the persistent violation
of international law’s avowed norms of freedom and equality, and the obfuscations
of that violation that the articulation of the norms has performed, this scholarship
tracks more explicitly liberal international law’s work in service to imperatives of
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capitalism: the domination performed by the norms themselves rather than by their
violation. International law, as these accounts show, created the conditions
necessary for capitalism by ‘reconstructing the world in the image of a particular
kind of ‘‘free’’ and ‘‘equal’’ or ‘‘sovereign’’ legal subject’, one with individual
rights, especially freedom of religion and conscience, and rights of property and
freedom to trade (Parfitt, 2019, p. 57).
The democratic nation-state as it emerged in Europe, then, was both a creature
and an agent of imperial capitalism, though in its self-conception it was the
antithesis of empire and its successor in a historical progression toward a more just
and equal world. Just as the capitalist corporation is sometimes described as an
‘externality machine’ – a structure designed to internalize profits while offloading
costs onto others – the western democratic nation has never been self-sustaining,
but rather took the form that it did only by imposing devastating costs elsewhere. I
have alluded to the attractions of some liberal and democratic norms and of the
ideal of an international community of nations treating one another with mutual
respect as independent and as equals; the same can be said of the concern for the
dignity and moral equality of every individual that underlies cosmopolitan projects
in political theory. Du Bois himself saw ‘but one adequate method of salvation –
the giving of democratic weapons of self-defense to the defenseless’ (at other times
he might have said the taking of such weapons by the defenseless) (Du Bois, 1915,
p. 712). If these values are to serve as the basis for critique or constructive political
projects we must continue to reckon as he did with their imperial entanglements
past and present.
Jennifer Pitts
Theory’s Empire
The critique and rejection of imperial rule was, and has remained, a persistent
element of that form of government from its inception. For a long time, however,
that element had been obscured by the major theories of global political life. The
tendency had been, instead, to favor the core concerns of a certain class of
metropolitan administrators and theorists who, whether overtly or surreptitiously,
promoted their own governments’ rights to dominate over much of the rest of the
world. Then, around three decades ago, something unusual began to happen: the
relatively narrow professional guild of political theorists, largely occupying
academic institutions in the global north, started to push back against ‘the West’s’
claims to rightfully dominate ‘the rest’ more systematically and directly than had
previously been the case. These critical efforts have since become quite
mainstream. The stakes of this ‘turn to empire’ in political theory seem to lie in
reforming the profession as an institutional and intellectual project. In demon-
strating how political theory has traditionally justified the political aspirations of
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imperial governors, it is hoped that students and scholars of the field might begin to
think of their work beyond and against these entanglements.
In what follows, I want to suggest that the extent to which this project might be
successful turns on how political theorists have conceived of the relationship
between ‘the political’ and ‘the international’ to date, and how to conceive of that
relationship otherwise. Taking the international seriously in political theory
requires conceiving of the field as imperialist, not just in the content of its canon,
but more fundamentally in the way it is constituted as a field. The imperialism of
the field consists, in the first instance, in alternately excluding and subsuming forms
of thought and action that emerge from beyond the recognizable boundaries of the
political, a category founded in reference to Euro-American canons and institutions
of government, as Ince and Pitts here recognize. These boundaries have been
codified in the separation of theories of ‘the political’ from theories of ‘the
international’, such that the international comes to be understood as external to the
properly political.
Accounts of the field’s historical and ongoing imperial entanglements helpfully
unpack how this particular relationship has worked to justify Euro-American
imperialism. Pitts’ recent Boundaries of the International is a very fine example of
such scholarship. However, such accounts also tend to somewhat problematically
reduce ‘the international’ to those entanglements, external to and readily addressed
by political theory’s critical resources. This runs the risk of replicating and reifying
the political/international division upon which so much of the field’s imperialism
has been premised. This need not be the case. Instead, it is possible to view the
international as the condition of possibility for political theorizing itself. And if the
challenge for political theorists of empire is to address questions about the purpose,
legitimacy and potential future(s) of the field, this view of the international may
prove a fruitful starting point to take up the analytical work necessary to meeting
that challenge.
What does it mean to say that political theory is an ‘imperialist’ enterprise? The
political theorist identifies, defines and produces understandings of statements,
ideas, texts, acts, and authors that meet the criteria of being ‘political.’ By
extension, they must either reject any such idea, author, episode, etc. that they
determine to be non-political, or establish criteria for its inclusion within the
political. These are routine discriminations, necessary for the maintenance of any
discipline. But they are what make political theory, in fact, an imperialist enterprise
– and, as we well know, most modern disciplines are (Wallerstein, 1984). It is not
simply the problem of a particular canon’s particular historical entanglements with
particular imperial formations. It is something closer to the problem that ‘empire’
poses in the meaning of its etymological root, imperium, ‘absolute or supreme
power or dominion… complete control or influence; supreme command’ (OED).
To say that political theory is something of an imperialist enterprise is to say that it
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lays claim to a dominion over the means to conceptualize the ways that humans
attempt to live together . There are a couple of variations on the way this plays out.
In the first – let’s call it the supremacist variation – the boundaries of the field
and its core concepts are tightly circumscribed and secured, arrogating the political
to a singular geo-historical tradition. It is in this register that we can understand
Hannah Arendt (1977 [1961]), for example, when she states that ‘the very word
[‘political’], which in all European languages still derives from the historically
unique organization of the Greek city-state, echo[es] the experiences of the
community which first discovered the essence and the realm of the political…
Whatever occurs in this space of appearances is political by definition, even when it
is not a direct product of action. What remains outside it, such as the great feats of
barbarian empires, may be impressive and noteworthy, but it is not political, strictly
speaking’ (p. 154). One can say this is imperial to the extent that the supremacy of
the political is preserved through a series of operations in which its boundaries are
secured: the political is elevated to the status of the highest and most complete
realization of human attempts to live together, and ultimately alternative formations
are considered lesser, secondary curiosities, if they are considered at all.
Another variation runs in the opposite direction. We’ll call this the expansionist
variant. Here, the political, and/or its conceptual relatives or subsidiaries –
democracy, sovereignty, the res publica, freedom, equality, justice, and the like –
are taken to be the organizing principles of, or principles for, organizing human
communal life everywhere. As Cedric J. Robinson (2016 [1980]) put it, ‘the
political precept as a descriptive capsule for enclosing segments of human
experience and organization has … [monopolized] the concerns, interests, and
phenomena of arenas formerly dominated or characterized by alternative or truly
alien instruments of reconciliation or resolution’ (p. 23). Here political theorists
may spar over conceptual and historical transformations in the contents of these
organizing principles, or over their relative value for understanding politics. They
may even push to admit new entries into the pantheon of sanctified ideas, texts,
authors or qualifying metrics of the political. But they do not question the ability
for the political, its canon, and its subsidiaries to adequately account for the idea,
text, author, event or form of order in question. While this allows for a certain
disciplinary capaciousness, one potential consequence may be that, as Adom
Getachew (2016) has recently argued, this mode of political theory flattens the
specificity of other human attempts to live together when they fall outside of the
available grammars of the political. The result is the conceptual colonization and
expropriation of essential specificities for the purpose of (re)affirming the ‘true’
universality of the political.
As Pitts argues in Boundaries of the International (2018), these supremacist
isolations and expansionist subsumptions were initially formulated and played out
by Euro-American political and legal theorists from the eighteenth-century onward,
generating much of the conceptual architecture that we have come to associate with
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the imperialism of the modern international. When eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century political and legal thinkers sought to address the question of Europe’s place
in the world, they almost invariably began from the assumption that the supreme
realization of human efforts to live together was manifested in or between nation-
states on the European continent in the form of properly ‘political’ societies. This
belief yielded two seemingly contradictory, but nevertheless complementary
visions of and for ‘the international’ that justified structures of European
imperialism. On the one hand, because the high achievement of properly political
society was peculiar to European people and nation-states, none of the relevant
imperatives associated with the establishment of just and legitimate political
society (contract, consent, representation, protection of individual and communal
rights, just conduct in war, and so forth) pertained beyond the metropole. On the
other hand, because considerations essential to the establishment of properly
political society did not pertain beyond the metropole, eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century thinkers also often insisted that extra-political measures be taken to expand
and project the properly political onto those spaces and populations where proper
political society had yet to take root – the ‘transition to modernity’ that Nichols
points to below. The seeming contradiction between these two positions was
largely superficial. Far from negating each other, they in fact worked in tandem to
produce an understanding of the international as an external space wherein those
persons and governments claiming the high civilization and authority of ‘political’
society were not required to be accountable to peoples who supposedly had not
developed that form of community and authority. Thus the intellectual mouthpieces
of Euro-American imperialism, as Pitts puts it, obscured ‘the fact that some of
Europe’s most important powers were global empires – rather than simply
territorially bounded communities of citizens engaged in a shared, and implicitly
republican, political project’ – through treatises that sought to define a supposedly
universal ‘law of nations’. This ‘largely disregarded the violence of European
commercial and imperial expansion [and effaced] the features of hierarchy and
imperial extension that characterized the world system [from the eighteenth-
century] through the present’ (pp. 72–73).
The consequence of this legacy is that political theory has traditionally rendered
the international as an external space, separate and distinct from the properly
political, thus enabling political thinkers simultaneously to secure the political from
the messy realities of the world beyond Europe and to remake the world in that
image. Pitts’ account of this dynamic is a very helpful diagnosis of the relationship
between political theory and international law in Euro-American imperialism. But
it is also an illustrative example of how such critiques can formally replicate the
dynamic of the political/international division that they set out to destabilize. While
Pitts is quite correct that our contemporary grammars of international law,
community, order, security, and so on have frequently justified North Atlantic
domination over the rest of the world, focusing on this particular understanding of
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the international may also be a little reductive. For example, as Pitts notes above,
Boundaries provides very little insight into alternatives to European imperialist
discourses of the international from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Instead, we are (re)introduced to European political theorists – familiar and
unfamiliar – that were more or less self-aware and critical of their countrymen’s
and governments’ behaviors overseas. To be sure, Boundaries hints at one possible
alternative early on, in its discussion of how the Ottoman empire participated in
forms of diplomacy, exchange, treaty-making, and warfare with European states,
thus yielding a condition of internationality stubbornly irreducible (though
certainly not invulnerable) to the early-modern European states-system and its
legal, political, and theological underpinnings. Still, the Ottoman example remains
mostly a foil against which to draw into relief the imperialism of European
international thinking, and Europeans’ criticisms of that discourse.
These sorts of omissions are characteristic of the tendency in many of today’s
political theories of empire to focus mostly, if not exclusively, on how Euro-
American imperialism has monopolized visions and practices of international and
inter-communal interchange. This, of course, is an essential point of departure for
any effort to critique the legacy of that imperial monopoly. However, focusing
exclusively on European imperialist provincialism also risks crowding out what is,
presumably, the implicit upshot of such a critique: that is, to explore ideas,
institutions, and practices of internationalism beyond the Euro-American canon.
There are several examples from the same period that one could summon in an
effort to cultivate a new pool of resources that can provide accounts of alternative
principles, protocols, and foundations for understanding human attempts to live
together. One could, for instance, place Emer de Vattel’s account of the
problematic but complex distinctions between Christian and non-Christian nations,
and of the prerogatives or responsibilities for each party that followed therefrom,
alongside the contemporaneous attempt to address these questions by a thinker
from the Islamic world, like the Sufi scholar Sidi al-Mukhtar ibn Ahmad al-Kunti
(see Grovogui, 2017). When considering how critics of empire and the slave trade
addressed the British Parliament, Burke’s contemporary Olaudah Equiano might
provide a more complete picture of the growing critical chorus around these issues
in the late-eighteenth-century. And, if one wishes to consider how ideas about the
perlocutionary self-evidence of law came to characterize trends in nineteenth-
century legal theory such as European positivism, it may be worth also considering
Maōri expressions of political authority and autonomy over their lands and peoples
in the first article of the 1835 He Whakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tirene
(Declaration of Independence of the United Tribes of New Zealand).
Now, an al-Kunti, an Equiano, or the Maōri might not appear in much of political
theory’s literature concerning empire because non-European criticisms of empire
were, historically, either unknown to or considered irrelevant by Euro-American
thinkers. It is certainly true that the imperialism of Euro-American political and
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international thought was only possible through rituals of direct and indirect
discriminations that rendered non-European criticisms irrelevant or unacceptable to
accounts of what political and international life were or could be. However,
because the imperialism of Euro-American political and international thought
materialized in large part through the direct or indirect practices of invalidating
non-European criticisms, leaving those accounts unconsidered may also carry the
unintended consequence of unwittingly replicating the original discriminations that
fortified Euro-American claims to the primacy of the political and the imperialist
vision of the international. One way to possibly mitigate the risk of replicating
those discriminations, therefore, is not to begin from the assumption that the
international proper is a pre-existing structure of imperialism. Instead, we might
treat the international as a way of responding to questions of identity, judgment,
and action that emerge when two or more roughly discrete communities come into
contact, and potentially, into conflict. In other words, as R.B.J. Walker (2016) has
suggested, one might understand the claim to the international as the condition of
possibility for providing an account of who and what any discrete and bounded
polity, and attendant account of political life, might be.
The fact that Euro-American empire has remained the overwhelming form that
those relationships have taken is not to be dismissed, but refusing to allow the
international to be reduced to that relationship would be an essential step in
sustaining a critique of that form of imperialism. This might involve decentering
received accounts and canons of the political originating from North Atlantic
promoters of Euro-American imperialism, or at least understanding those accounts
in more dynamic relationship with counterpoints to the fundamental premises of
those accounts and canons during the times they were being articulated. This is not
to suggest that theorizing the political is incompatible with the conception of the
international that I am proposing, and that the former should be abandoned in favor
of the latter. A modest reversal in the traditional way we identify and criticize
political problems, particularly where these abut claims to the international, may be
in order, however. So far, political theorists of empire have begun with the problem
of empire as the condition of internationalism to highlight certain conceptions of
what is and what is not political. The result has been to say that, to combat
imperialist internationalism, any particular criticism of empire has to be seen as the
true preserve of the political, and/or that the field must readjust the boundaries of
the political so that it can adequately encompass and account for those criticisms.
But alternatively, viewing the international as an unsettled question, as the
condition of possibility for claims about what is or is not political, may ultimately
help chip a little bit more at the petrified boundaries that have for so long mapped
the cognitive terrain of theory’s empire.
Timothy Bowers Vasko
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Political Economy, Capitalism, and Empire: Rematerializing
a Research Agenda
The ‘colonial turn’ witnessed in the last two decades in political theory has
occasioned a valuable encounter with the methodological nationalist parameters of
the field. What began as the reappraisal of several canonical figures has extended to
interrogating the imperial provenance of cardinal concepts that have shaped the
discipline in North America. The enterprise has involved detecting, on the one
hand, the imperial genealogies of the questions central to political theory, and, on
the other hand, how the erasure of these genealogies enshrines the nation-state as
political thought’s politico-juridical horizon. Exemplary is Mills’ (2015) indictment
of liberal political philosophy as ‘ideology’. The powerful fiction of a social
contract between free and equal persons who constitute the (implicitly national)
body politic, Mills maintains, obfuscates the colonial histories of liberal polities
riddled with racialized exclusions. Scaling up the question from the intra-polity to
the inter-polity level, Pitts’ (2018) latest book trains its sights on the pervasive
meta-narrative of ‘international society’, which recounts the history of the global
order as the progressive universalization of sovereign equality. In her corrective,
she reveals international law to be an imperial language wherein sovereign
statehood represents not the axiomatic premise of the international system but the
effect of the boundaries that excluded non-European polities from its remit.
The two books just cited do not simply illustrate the state of the art in political
theory after the colonial turn. In their preoccupation with personhood and
recognition, they also encapsulate the field’s continued focus on questions of
inclusion and exclusion. At least since Uday Mehta’s (1999) controversial
characterization of liberalism as an intrinsically imperial system of thought, the
most influential efforts to unravel empire’s relation to political theory have
revolved around the politics of representing non-European or colonized others.
Scholars have quarried the European history of political thought for constructions
of the universal and particular, negotiations of cultural pluralism and difference,
and controversies over civilizational hierarchies.
An unfortunate, if unintended, consequence of this bias for the representational
has been the neglect of political economy as a constitutive feature of empire and its
afterlives. The following reflections identify some of the analytic limitations that
follow from this neglect and contour the potential of situating the political theory of
empire in the historical unfolding of global capitalism.
Given the centrality of equality, autonomy, and justice to political theory, it is
unsurprising that political theorists have mainly construed European colonial
empires as structures of domination, exclusion and injustice. Colonial empires were
certainly these. But they also comprised systems of dispossession, exploitation and
surplus transfer. Forged in the imperial crucible were not only racialized
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hierarchies of full, partial and non-personhood, and graduated capacities for
contract, representation and self-rule. Colonial empires also incubated the property,
exchange and labor regimes that have subordinated the socio-ecological reproduc-
tive capacities of the planet to the relentless accumulation of capital.
Bypassing the political economy of empire, and thus viewing Indigenous
dispossession, slavery, and imperial despotism primarily through the prism of
racism, white supremacy, and cultural arrogance, risks falling into a sort of
idealism or inverted reductionism. The lexical priority accorded to these
ideological formations downplays the fact that slavery, settlerism and despotism
were above all modalities of expropriating land, labor and social knowledge, and
reorganizing them in the pursuit of wealth, profit and revenue. The violent imperial
processes that built the global capitalist economy receive frequent condemnation
but little sustained reflection in the scholarship on the political theory of empire.
The attention instead fixates on the liaisons between imperial rule and European
political philosophy, generating hierarchical constructions of cultural difference
and spurious universalizations of provincial European values.
This tendency stems partly from the disciplinary practices of a subfield that has
long been anchored in the exegeses of privileged texts. It also reproduces the
theoretical protocols and literary bent of postcolonial studies from which the
political theory of empire has borrowed heavily. Two theoretical choices in
particular breed a disconnect from political economic analysis. The first is to
organize inquiry around the meta-binary of colonizer/colonized. The second is to
conceive of this binary as a political and civilizational axis of power to be dissected
with the tools of literary and cultural criticism. The outcome, as Neil Lazarus puts
it, is a ‘category error’ that fails to grasp colonialism as ‘part and parcel of a larger,
enfolding historical dynamic, which is that of capitalism in its global trajectory’
(2011, p. 7). The inattention to political economy is arguably unconscious in
postcolonial theory, whereas in political theory it instantiates a conscious aversion
to categories of social analysis in the historical study of ideas (Moyn, 2014). The
victory of linguistic contextualism (the so-called ‘Cambridge School’) has marked
intellectual histories informed by sociological frameworks as imprecise or, worse,
reductionist and anachronistic. As a result, the social history of political thought
inspired by C.B. Macpherson’s (1962) Marxist interpretation has found little
traction outside a limited academic circle.
The colonial turn at once exhibits the marginalization of social theory and
represents an opportunity for recuperating some of its insights – some of which are
well illustrated in Nichols’ essay in this exchange. While there are good reasons for
questioning the adequacy of ‘possessive market society’ or ‘agrarian capitalism’ in
theorizing the social context of ideas, these do not justify abandoning social
contextualization tout court. Social theory can prove especially useful for
addressing certain limitations of the current political theory of empire. A telling
case is the manner in which various forms of imperial violence and coercion are
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treated in the literature (here, again, Nichols’ view is instructive). Many scholars
readily invoke the litany of abuses that colonial empires visited upon non-
Europeans: land expropriation, bonded labor, predatory commodity markets, and
tribute extraction, all subtended by a heavy dose of force. They often subsume these
processes under a monolithic category of ‘imperial violence’, which then forms the
static backdrop for the real question, namely, whether the thinkers under study
condoned or criticized it based on their assessment of the capacities of the
colonized. In doing so, political thinkers’ judgments of who the colonized are take
priority over, and are assumed to shape their view of, what the colonizers do.
A different picture emerges when one situates imperial violence within a
theoretical framework that explicates the agendas that animate it, the specific forms
of its exercise, and the patterned effects that it produces. A particularly generative
approach to imperial violence, one that has informed my own research along with
many others’, takes as its departure point the Marxian notion of ‘the primitive
accumulation of capital’. Marx (1976) used the term to explain the historical
emergence of the capitalist mode of production through a range of violent colonial
transformations that remade the world as they tore it apart. In the eponymous
section in the first volume of Capital, Marx cited under ‘primitive accumulation’
the same violent practices and coercive institutions that crop up in the scholarship
in political theory and empire, including the plunder of precious minerals in the
Americas, the Atlantic slave trade, and commercial imperialism in Asia.
Recasting these episodes as vectors of primitive accumulation changes their
analytic register. What were previously undifferentiated descriptions of imperial
violence now reappear as building blocks of a theory of capitalist development,
revealing the ‘colonial’ contexts of political ideas to be ‘colonial capitalist’
contexts (Ince, 2018b). The perspective of political economy holds not additive but
transformative significance, as it sheds new light on empire’s impact on political
thought, including on the politics of universalism and cultural hierarchies. It
discloses how European constructions of cultural and racial difference were shaped
by the imperative to access colonial land, labor and resources; by the strategies and
discourses devised to achieve these ends; and by the metropolitan perceptions of
these ends and methods. The optic of colonial capitalism helps disaggregate
imperial violence into, for instance, the violence of slave-plantation capitalism,
commercial capitalism, and settler capitalism, as well as their context-specific
articulations. Such theoretical parsing of imperial violence in turn enables a more
precise view of the criticisms that it incited and the rationalizations it called forth at
specific historical junctures.
Patrick Wolfe’s (2001) oft-cited discussion of miscegenation laws in the USA
elucidates the weight of political economic agendas in shaping the construction of
social difference. Wolfe explains the diametrically opposed applications of the
blood quanta laws to Blacks and Native Americans by recourse to the primitive
accumulation of capital that combined enslaved labor and evacuated land. A similar
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political economic mediation is discernible in the works of several European
thinkers who have been of interest to the scholarship on the political theory of
empire. Highlighting this mediation enables us to answer a number of unresolved
puzzles in the literature: for instance, John Locke’s argument that American land
was open to unilateral appropriation because Native Americans lacked a monetary
economy; or Edmund Burke’s sympathy for Britain’s oppressed Indian subjects but
lack thereof for Africans and Native Americans within the empire; or David
Hume’s notable silence regarding Atlantic slavery, despite his voluble discussions
of ancient, feudal and Asiatic bondage; or Adam Smith’s failure to extend his
rebuke of colonial conquest, plunder and slavery in the West and the East Indies to
agrarian settler colonialism in North America.
The puzzle that each case poses is why certain historically specific practices and
not others were deemed to be universal, or why certain cultural differences were
built into civilizational hierarchies while others were considered irrelevant for
justifying or criticizing imperial practices. Intra- and inter-textual protocols and
culturalist preoccupations hold limited analytic capacity for explaining, and not
simply chronicling, the differential assessment of universals and particulars (call it
the ‘problem of competing universals’). The political economy of empire
constitutes a more productive departure point: it illuminates the extraordinary
commodification of the seventeenth-century Atlantic world where colonial land for
capitalist agriculture was the prime asset (Locke); the designation of division of
labor and commercial complexity as the index of civilization in eighteenth-century
stadial theory (Burke); colonial slavery’s paradoxical status as a barbarous yet
commercial institution central to modern civility (Hume); and the institutional
dependence of settler capitalism on land-markets established by imperial acts of
land appropriation (Smith) (Ince, 2011, 2012, 2018a).
In each case, the variegated socio-legal forms of colonial capitalism confronted
contemporaries with a profound ideological challenge: the modern world of
commerce, with its promise of liberty, prosperity and enlightenment, gestated
within colonialism’s ferment of chaos, cruelty and venality. Equally importantly,
that we encounter comparable tensions in the works of both imperial functionaries
(Locke, Burke) and skeptics (Smith, Hume) suggests that this was an institutional-
ideological (as opposed to intellectual-discursive) problem that exceeded the
ethical predilections and moral sensibilities of individual figures. European
imperialism’s impact on political concept formation, within and beyond Europe,
thus cannot be fully grasped without attending to the capitalist social forms woven
into the fabric of imperial relations. These were the province of ‘political
economy’, which arose from metropolitan attempts to comprehend, institutionalize
and administer the process of wealth and revenue creation across imperial
interdependencies. Much more than a language of technical administration,
political economy constituted a mode of ethico-political reflection that furnished
discourses of civilization and savagery with much of their socio-historical referents
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and evaluative metrics. The extant literature’s focus on civilization, universalism
and difference has, by and large, evacuated these discourses of their political
economic content.
To say this much is not to exhort every scholar in the field to incorporate an
analysis of capitalism, much less turn historical sociologists or social historians, but
rather to call for expanding the range of social relations and issues comprising the
relevant contexts of political ideas. The political economic constitution of empire
offers one such contextual register at a particularly opportune moment. The
ecumenical and growing fields of the ‘new history of capitalism’ (Beckert and
Rockman, 2016) and ‘racial capitalism’ (Dawson, 2016; Fraser, 2016) are
generating a range of pressing questions that invite political theorizing. Their
centering of colonialism and slavery in (albeit hemispheric) accounts of capitalist
development enlarges the space for exploring the reception, justification or
rejection of colonial-capitalist practices and institutions in legal, political and social
thought. Political theorists would be particularly well situated to contribute to this
space. Concomitantly, a closer engagement with political economy, historical
sociology and critical geography promises a renewed social history of political
theory, one that is imperial in scope and attentive to the historical specificity of
political languages (Kennedy, 2012).
There are many methodological entry points to this agenda, including but not
limited to reappraising privileged legal, political and economic tracts; mapping out
the ‘middle’ political thought of legislators, courts, administrators and publicists; or
excavating vernacular yet comparable ideological formations arising out of
imperial social formations. There are no a priori reasons against moving between
multiple levels of discourse, or for that matter, against constructing syncretic
theoretical frameworks (drawing upon, for instance, Polanyian, Braudelian or
Foucaultian analysis).
A social turn in the political theory of empire would pay another analytic
dividend, which can only be signaled here. If, as many critical scholars and activists
have noted, and as Pitts observes above, the imperial constitution of the global
order has persisted beyond formal decolonization, then the afterlives of empire
arguably remain more salient at the institutional-ideological level. To consider a
pivotal theme in the literature, the switch from the language of ‘civilization’ in the
nineteenth century to that of ‘development’ in the twentieth, to the wholesale
abandonment of development nomenclature in the twenty-first, cannot be explained
by discourse analysis alone. Their full significance qua discursive formations rests
in their embeddedness in the institutional-ideological problem of governing the
peripheries that global capitalism cannot but continuously reproduce within and
across borders. This problem has generated oscillating and recombinant modes of
institutional reform, indirect rule, military intervention, legal engineering and
financial coercion, both during and after formal colonialism. Elucidating the
persistent imperial logics of peripheralization, devalorization and disposability
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through their episodic reconfigurations requires a capacious understanding of
empire and a different understanding of what it means to theorize it. Political theory
would have as much to gain from as to contribute to this revisionist enterprise.
Onur Ulas Ince
Context, Violence, and Methodological Drift in the Study of Empire
The publication of Pitts’ impressive and erudite Boundaries of the International
presents an occasion to revisit the past several decades of scholarship in political
theory and the history of political thought concerning empire and imperialism.
Indeed, a summary comparison of this work with Pitts’ earlier study, A Turn to
Empire – itself a watershed publication – provides a point of departure for tracing
some of the longer and larger arc of the field. For while the later work is in many
ways a continuation of the project begun in the earlier, there is a notable divergence
with regard to basic questions of method.
A Turn to Empire fits legibly within the larger ‘historical contextualist’ approach
to political theory which has dominated the study of empire since the mid to late
1990s and is most heavily indebted to the Cambridge school. Thus, when Pitts and
others working in this vein set out to extrapolate from this approach to the study of
empire and imperialism, the notion of ‘context’ with which they were working was
primarily restricted to the discursive context of elite, canonical thinkers’ immediate
interlocutors. Hence,A Turn to Empire focused on reconstructing the (often
parenthetic) references to non-European peoples in the writings of recognizable
figures in the canon of western political thought, such as Smith, Burke, Bentham,
Mill, and Tocqueville.
Boundaries departs from this method in important ways. In it, the notion of
‘context’ has expanded considerably to include socio-economic and institutional
backgrounds. These not only inform the content of the texts and concepts in
question, they provide the mechanism of articulation for their uptake in actual
practices of imperial governance. Methodologically, this not only means reading a
much wider swath of thinkers – particularly those more directly involved in empire
building – but also supplementing textual exegesis and ‘close reading’ with
archival work into institutions and practices of imperial governance. Boundaries
contains glimpses of this deeper institutional history, particularly as regards
practices of legal decision-making. A second change concerns the growing
attention paid to the perspective of the governed rather than merely the governors
in the imperial world. This trajectory is more muted and tentative relative to the
first, but is discernible nevertheless. In A Turn to Empire, Pitts noted that the
canonical thinkers under examination ‘communicated very little with their
countries’ colonial subjects and had no firsthand knowledge of non-European
societies’ (Pitts, 2005, p. 242). In Boundaries, however, we find an increased
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appreciation for the intellectual and political agency of non-elite, colonized and/or
subaltern actors, moving away from what might be called a dissemination theory of
imperial ideas towards an interactive or ‘contrapuntal’ one (see Morefield, 2019,
and Tully, 2008). The latter emphasizes that key concepts and categories of empire
do not emerge in the metropole only to trickle down to the periphery, but rather
spring out of the dynamic interactions and contestations between governors and
governed. Accordingly, Boundaries offers an extended attack on a longstanding
dissemination narrative that ‘depicts modern international law as developed
exclusively within Europe and then exported to the rest of the world, rather than as
partly forged in the course of European imperial expansion and through European
interactions with extra-European states and societies’ (Pitts, 2018, p. 14).
This contribution pursues the notion that these changes within Pitts’ contribution
to the study of empire and imperialism are symptomatic of a more general
‘methodological drift’ in the field as a whole. I refer to this as a ‘drift’ because it
has largely taken place without any overt re-theorizing of methods. In what follows,
I consider one possible impetus behind this movement in the form of a fraught and
frictional relationship between Cambridge school intellectual history and critical
social theory. I then unpack some of the potential implications of methodological
drift with respect to one domain of substantive inquiry with which I am most
familiar: the study of settler colonialism in the late modern and contemporary
Anglophone world.
The interpretive framework that casts the largest shadow over the study of
empire and imperialism in political theory and the history of political thought is the
so-called Cambridge school. Initially developed by Quentin Skinner and J.G.A.
Pocock (inter alia), the Cambridge school developed into a highly influential
research agenda in the fields of intellectual history and the history of political
thought. Building off J.L. Austin’s speech-act theory and the approach to ‘language
games’ developed by the later Wittgenstein, Cambridge school thinkers have
sought to reinterpret classical texts in the history of political thought as complex
illocutionary interventions. This required relating text to context, for to understand
a speech act is to understand what it does within a particular context of action: its
function, not its meaning.
This approach already contained some elements of what we might consider to be
a critical social theory. To read a text such as Hobbes’ Leviathan in this way is
already to de-reify it in a certain respect. Namely, it entails grasping the author not
as someone engaged in a transhistorical conversation with other luminaries
ruminating over eternal questions, but as a political actor, i.e. someone trying to
accomplish a practical objective within a real debate in their own time. Read in this
light, the line between ‘canonical’ and lesser-known works begins to break down. If
a text gains its force and meaning in its relation to context, then reconstructing this
context moves us beyond the interpretation of self-standing ‘great works’.
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Despite these important insights, Cambridge school approaches have neverthe-
less reached a certain impasse in the attempt to connect intellectual and social
history effectively. Although great emphasis is placed upon context from within
this approach, the ‘context’ in question remains a highly intellectualized one, often
essentially reducing down to the immediate elite interlocutors of the author in
question, as Pitts recognizes above. Moreover, it means reconstructing the intended
audience from his or her own standpoint. The result is an approach to intellectual
history that remains relatively silent on macro level socio-economic developments
– as Ulas Ince also points out in his contribution to this exchange – and thus a rather
startling separation of intellectual and social history.
One implication of this has been that those working in the Cambridge school
style often struggle to explain the mechanism by which one intellectual tradition is
crowded out by another: they lack an account of the differential material tractability
of intellectual discourses. This problem is generated, in part, by a common
conflation between two different problems regarding the relation between
intellectual discourses and material context. One reason that intellectual history
has been largely separated from social history in the study of political thought
resides with the concern that overemphasis on socio-economic forces robs thinkers
of their intellectual autonomy and agency by turning social and material
circumstances into direct causal mechanisms that generate concepts and ideas.
However, one can adopt a more materialist orientation without this reductio ad
absurdum. One way to reframe the matter is to consider it as pertaining to the
effect, rather than cause, of conceptual innovations in the history of ideas. From
this perspective, we do not focus exclusively on the question of causation (what
caused this agent to say X?) but rather consider also impact (why did this agent’s
argument for X largely succeed?). When we examine the impact of intellectual
discourses – why some prevail over others – it is reasonable to conclude that this is
not merely a function of intelligibility (it conforms to recognizable standards of
meaning and rationality) but also of tractability (it appears feasible, converges with,
or finds appropriate support within social institutions and practices that enables it to
make good on its claims).
This points us to a second limitation of the Cambridge school approach. One of
its aims is to provide an account of a text from the author’s own standpoint, to
avoid imposing our own prejudices upon historically distant texts. The approach
begins from a methodological commitment to reconstruction from a first-person
perspective, generating two obstacles for social theory. First, it can make it more
difficult to account for the underlying motivation of the study. A Cambridge school
approach teaches us to read from within the worlds of historical actors themselves.
But why do this? The most obvious reply is that it gives us a more accurate, fairer
or truer account of what ‘really happened’. It is thus representational, i.e.,
attempting to correspond to reality as it was experienced by those who lived it.
Historical accuracy is a worthy goal. But this forecloses an analysis of several
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important questions in politics. Questions of impact, effect and tractability can
never be reconstructed only from the first-person present, for the author herself
cannot know what the uptake of her arguments will be. Instead, they must be
reconstructed from a third person, retrospective perspective. Moreover, we may
very well wish to examine the past explicitly from the standpoint of the present,
that is, as a means of understanding how the present order came about in the way
that it did. This presentist orientation is implied already by some historical
contextualist approaches to political theory, most obviously in the work of James
Tully, for instance, whose work aspires precisely to bridge Cambridge school and
critical-genealogical approaches (Tully, 2008, vol. 1, chs 1–2). In the bulk of the
cases, however, it is denied or obfuscated, in which case the interpretative method
threatens to draw a falsely stark division between past and present (see Turner,
2016).
To understand the implications of this, consider a set of debates sparked by the
1999 publication of Liberalism and Empire by Uday Singh Mehta. Mehta set out to
examine a certain tendency of liberal thinkers to convert abstract theories of
universal rights into exclusionary practices, domination and the authorization of
violence when actualized on the imperial periphery. Subsequent analysis has
frequently challenged Mehta’s framework, either by defending the specific liberal
thinkers Mehta took to task, or by providing counter-cases that purport to
undermine or nuance the general picture he provided (Mantena, 2010; McCarthy,
2009; Muthu, 2003; Pitts, 2005). In sum, whereas Mehta saw a relatively
monolithic tradition of liberalism and empire, critics have found internal
contradiction, heterodoxy and diversity. In my evaluation, claims about the
internal diversity of broad descriptors such as ‘liberalism’ or even ‘British
Imperialism’ can be simultaneously true and yet limited. They are true in the sense
that they are more accurate descriptions of these intellectual traditions as viewed
from an internal, first-person perspective. It is descriptively true that Mill’s views
on European imperialism were importantly different from, say, those of Locke or
Kant, and that this undermines the notion that there is a singular, unified nexus
between liberalism and empire extending from the seventeenth-century to the
nineteenth or twentieth.
However, while true, there are at least two reasons also to consider this a limited
and partial claim.
First, it may be question-begging as to the standard for evaluating the relative
coherence of an intellectual tradition. There is no absolute standard for determining
the uniformity or cohesion of an intellectual tradition. Instead, its coherence must
be evaluated relative to some relevant criteria, which will importantly hinge on the
perspective from which it is evaluated and the purposes for doing so. More
particularly, it is a function of the degree to which one’s critical perspective is
immanent or external to the tradition itself. Note that this does not mean the critic
herself must be wholly ‘internal’ or ‘external’ to the tradition, in terms of social or
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cultural location, only that the critical posture they adopt relative to it. If the
criterion is fully immanent to the tradition itself, the evaluation risks becoming self-
vindicatory, even tautological. Put more concretely and in the parameters that
matter here, a preoccupation with the internal heterogeneity of imperial traditions
may presuppose (rather than demonstrate) that the perspective of quarreling
imperial elites is the standpoint from which coherence should be evaluated, a
position that is rarely made explicit and, more to the point, must be argued for in
terms other than those of the imperial elites themselves (lest it become
tautological).
Second, there is no prima facie reason to privilege the perspective of those most
centrally positioned in the institutional field responsible for reproducing the
intellectual tradition in question. Rather, as decades of work in critical race,
feminist and postcolonial analysis has taught us, there are good political and
epistemic reasons to privilege the standpoint of those most peripheral to a dominant
intellectual tradition and the institutions that function to reproduce it. Indeed, these
others may teach us valuable lessons about its impact which its designers and
defenders cannot or will not see. In sum, by reconstructing the intellectual history
of empire from the internal, first-person perspective of European elites, largely
without reference to the social context or material tractability of their arguments,
the historicist work of the Cambridge variant has largely failed to grapple with the
implications of the perspectival shift generated by postcolonial and decolonial
analysis.
To give this set of claims more substance, and to unpack some of their possible
implications, consider two problems that have emerged in the specific field with
which my own research is concerned, the study of Anglo settler colonialism in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. When viewed from the interior, first-person
perspective of intellectual history, British and American imperialism of the
nineteenth century appears as a complex, heterogeneous collection of diverse
practices and idioms with little underlying coherent rationale. However, when we
view it from the standpoint of Indigenous peoples targeted by these policies, we see
a remarkable level of convergence. This is partially because of the standpoint of the
analysis, certainly. But it is also because these different vantages points are
attending to different aspects of the process as a whole. They operationalize
different evaluative criteria: while European intellectual history tends to focus on
intent, anti-colonial and Indigenous critique tends to focus on effect. That
prevailing work in the history of political thought commonly obscures this
distinction is itself symptomatic of a privileging of the forward-looking, first-
person perspective of imperial elites, since the overall structural effect of a set of
(seemingly) diverse policies is something that can only be grasped by retrospective
reflection. It is necessarily anachronistic to evaluate theorists on those terms, and
yet it is nevertheless indispensable to historically informed critical social theory.
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This becomes all the more acute when we consider the specific matter of
violence. The expansive and explosive colonization process described by James
Belich as a ‘settler revolution’ (2009) was uniformly devastating for those
Indigenous societies that stood in the way of the Anglo settler wave. Although
Indigenous peoples responded to contact with Anglo settlers in multitudinous ways
– including military conflict, negotiation, cooperation, assimilation and self-
segregation – in all cases, they eventually found themselves outnumbered and
outgunned, and finally bearing witness to the total transformation, if not outright
destruction, of their worlds. In many cases, the violence wrought by settlers was
intentional. Colonizers physically attacked Indigenous peoples, assaulted, mur-
dered and hunted them for sport. In other cases, although settlers did not necessarily
intend violence, destruction nevertheless followed in their wake. The undermining
of social, cultural, religious and economic systems caused untold devastation to
Indigenous worlds, but in many cases settlers did not understand themselves to be
undertaking acts of violence at all. Rather, their policies were frequently designed
with the express intent of assisting Indigenous peoples in the (presumed) necessary
transition to modernity. Notwithstanding whatever settler elites may have thought,
this colonial intent is not the only relevant criterion when evaluating the overall
effect of these policies.
Indigenous communities have survived and even thrived in the midst of this long
assault. They have innovated, adapted, fought, fled and negotiated their way
through the various iterations of a colonial system that, from their perspective,
retains a relatively uniform underlying objective: to prevent them from being
Indigenous, i.e. living according to their own ways on their own lands. In other
cases, however, colonial violence was more successful. Whole societies have been
eliminated. Colonization entailed – and entails – genocide. Grappling with this
form of eliminatory violence poses a unique problem for traditional approaches to
the history of political thought. It has, however, already been extensively theorized
in the field of social history. In his careful historical reconstruction of the
colonization process in the Great Basin region of the United States, extending from
the late sixteenth to the mid-nineteenth century, the Indigenous (Shoshone)
historian Ned Blackhawk provides indispensable conceptual and methodological
resources for political theorists in this regard. As Blackhawk argues, the analysis of
colonization requires the consideration of violence as something more than another
object of study, as, for instance, the grim calculation of lives lost. More than that,
violence must become for us ‘an interpretative concept as well as a method for
understanding’ (Blackhawk, 2006, p. 5). Colonial violence remade the world and
thus inescapably alters the lens through which we reflect backward upon history
itself. It ‘characterizes these Native worlds’, just as it ‘has also destabilized the
categories of analysis used to describe them’ (Blackhawk, 2006, p. 8). In a similar
vein, historian Karl Jacoby pauses in his own darkly gripping account of the 1871
Camp Grant Massacre to consider the conceptual and methodological challenges
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posed by colonial violence, at once ‘the most familiar and the most overlooked
subject in American history’ (Jacoby, 2008, p. 2). He writes:
Reckoning with this violence involves facing some of the more difficult
aspects not only of the American past but of the historical enterprise itself.
Unlike almost any other object of historical study, violence simultaneously
destroys and creates history. The physical annihilation of another human
produces a profound absence that distorts the historical record for all time.
One of the most immediate manifestations of violence is thus a terrifying
silence that no testimony of the past can fathom in its entirety (Jacoby, 2008,
p. 3).
Prevailing work in the history of political thought on empire and imperialism has
yet to grapple with this ‘terrifying silence’. More pointedly, it may lack the
resources to do so. Prevailing methods in political theory – preoccupied as they
have been with the intellectual context of canonical texts – implicitly skew towards
a privileging of dominant elites. This is not merely a problem of ethical or political
solidarity with the oppressed: it is a problem that arises internal to the
methodological commitments of the field because it undermines our capacity to
account for research motivation and evaluative criteria in a non-tautological
manner. Rather than a mere object of study in some direct sense, violence must be
conceptualized as a background force that orders the historical record itself,
including by imposing vast and terrifying silences that introduce systemic biases
into any effort at contextual reconstruction. To reduce the intellectual history of
imperialism to the internal, forward-oriented, first-person perspective of major
contributors to ‘western political thought’ is to preclude in advance the possibility
of integrating this analysis with one that considers violence as a constitutive force
within history. The willingness and capacity on the part of European and Euro-
American settlers to use intense forms of eliminatory violence against Indigenous
peoples is at least part of what gave one set of intellectual traditions a certain
material tractability over and against another and helps us explain relative
convergence. Intellectual history shorn of social theory risks unreflectively
amplifying this effect by naturalizing the conditions under which theoretical
traditions are reproduced over time. This is just one set of reasons why the study of
empire and imperialism in the history of political thought must contend with the
ongoing problem of how to marry historical reconstruction with critical social
theory.
Robert Nichols
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